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BLUM v. FOX
seal is held to be of no significance as far as consideration
is concerned, consistency would seem to require that it
be deemed ineffectual to prolong the period of limitations.
The Courts do not go to this length2 4 and they hold, as in
the principal case, 2 that as the statute of limitations has
no effect on the validity or negotiable character of an instrument, its execution with a seal continues to make applicable the twelve year period of limitations.

COMPROMISING OF CLAIM BY EXECUTOR OR
ADMINISTRATOR WITHOUT APPROVAL
OF ORPHANS' COURT
Blum v. Fox1
In this case substituted administrators excepted to the
allowance of the administrator's account with reference to
an item for the payment of a claim to a person for alleged
services rendered to the intestate. The intestate, prior to
her death, expressed her desire that all her property be
given to said person, who had befriended her for a number of years, nursed her during illness, and provided her
with shelter and home. Though no testimony was taken
in the Orphans' Court, the inference may be made that the
amount paid by the removed administrator was in compromise settlement of a larger demand. The exceptants
base their objections to the claim on the ground that it
was in payment of an unliquidated claim for alleged services to the decedent which was without merit and was not
due and owing to the claimant. They further charge that
"97 A. L. R. 617, 620.
Supra note 1, 153 Md. 2.35, 241. The Court also considered an interesting point of pleading, supra note 1, 153 Md. 235, 244. Since the declaration referred to an instrument under seal "payable to Bertha D. Custis"
rather than "payable to the order of Bertha D. Custis," it alleged a "nonnegotiable single bill." According to the Court, the general issue pleas of
non a8sump8it and nil debet were inapplicable to this declaration and were
demurrable; the correct plea should have been non est factum, i. e., the
general issue plea suited to an action of debt upon a specialty. This is
correct as a statement of the common law rules of pleading, but in 1918
the General Assembly amended Md. Code, Art. 75, Sec. 4, so as to abolish
the action of debt and extend the action of assumpsit to cover all actions
er contractu on sealed as well as unsealed instruments; and further to
make non assumpsit and nil debet the proper general issue pleas in all
such actions. Apparently the Court overlooked this statute. See 1 Poe,
Pleading and Practice (Tiffany's Ed.) 649, note.
21

1

197 Atl. 117 (Md. 1938).
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the payment was made after the Orphans' Court had declined to approve the claim; and that the Orphans' Court
did not authorize it, as would have been required by statute. 2 The Orphans' Court passed an order whereby the
payment of the claim was disallowed, and the exception
to its inclusion in the administration account was sustained,
and the respondent was commanded to pay back to the estate the sum of $3,000 and to state a new administration
account and to pay over to the present administrators all
assets belonging to the estate of the deceased. On appeal
of the respondent from the order, Held: Affirmed.
The primary question in the case to be settled is the
liability of an executor or administrator who pays off a
claim against the estate of the decedent, which claim has
neither been probated nor passed by the Orphans' Court.
The point is also raised as to the power and authority of
the personal representative to compromise a claim against
the estate of the decedent.
Since the Orphans' Court has jurisdiction in the settlement of accounts of administrators and executors, the
propriety of the credit claimed is a matter for its decision.3
The general rule is that no administrator may discharge
any claim against his decedent, except at his own risk, unless the claim shall be first passed by the Orphans' Court
which granted him letters of administration or proved according to the requirements prescribed."
The object of the provision of the statutory sections
cited above is to secure the estate from unjust and unfounded claims. An administration account containing allowances not complying with those sections may not be ratified without evidence of this validity. They do not apply
to debts incurred by an executor in the course of an administration or in defense of a caveat but only to claims
against the decedent. An executor is ordinarily not authorized to pay a claim against his decedent unless the
statute a has been complied with, but if a creditor knows
*Md.

Code, Art. 93, Sec. 270.
* Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 256.
'Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 86, provides for the proof of a judgment or
decree; Ibid, Secs. 88, 90. 94. 95 for that of a specialty, bond, note, or protested bill of exchange and bill of exchange, respectively; Ibid, Secs. 91
and 92 for proof of a claim for rent and a preferred claim for rent in
arrears, respectively; Ibid, Secs. 93, 94, 95 for that of any claim on open
account; Ibid, Sec 97, for proof of the claim of the administrator; Ibid,
Sec. 87, for proof of the claim of more than one creditor; Ibid, Sec. 89, for
that of the claim of an assignee; and Ibid, Sec. 86, for any affidavits or
depositions taken out of the State.
'a Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 85.
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that his claim will be contested, or if he cannot procure
the proof that is necessary in order to comply with the provisions of that section he may sue the executor at law or
in equity as the nature of the claim may authorize, and if
he secures a judgment or decree he may participate in the
distribution of the estate in the executor's hands, although
his claim was not established in the manner required by
that section.'
When a claim is presented to the Orphans' Court for
passage and is disallowed, the claimant is not thereby precluded from suing at law or equity; or, if the claim is allowed or exhibited after proper probate, such allowance or
exhibition only operates to protect the executor if he pays
the claim. He may still refuse payment.' Where an executor pays a claim in part, an administrator d. b. n. subsequently appointed may dispute the balance of the claim."
The mere passage of a claim by the Orphans' Court or
its allowance in an ex parte administration account does
not prevent proper parties in interest from contesting it
before its payment. The claim's having been passed does
not constitute even a prima facie case in its favor. The
executor can sufficiently resist a claim by simply refusing
to pay it. He need not contest it before the Orphans'
Court.' If a claim is duly passed by the Orphans' Court
and the administrator has no reason to question its validity, he is protected in making payment without exacting
proof as required by statute. 10
Although the decisions appear to be uniform in laying
down the general rule that a personal representative should
not pay a claim without the proper decree of the Orphans'
Court, there are decisions which hold that the executor
may transfer property to the party whom the will directs
in anticipation of a proper decree of distribution, such decree being subsequently made." The majority of the jurisdictions state that the only way in which distribution
can be safely made is in obedience to a decree of the court,
'Bradford v. Street. 84 Md. 273, 35 Ati. 886 (1896) ; Schnepfe v. Schnepfe,
124 Md. 330, 335-336, 92 Atl. 891. Ann. Cas. 1916D 988 (1914).
H
Houck v. Houck, 112 Md. 122, 131, 76 Atl. 581 (1910). Md. Code, Art.
93, Sees. 101, 102, 119.
' Pole v. Simmons, 49 Md. 14, 19 (1878).
'Badders v. O'Brien, 114 Md. 451, 454, 79 At. 917 (1911) ; Bantz, Exr. v.
Bantz, 52 Md. 686, 690 (1879) ; Strasbaugh v. Dallam, 93 Md. 712, 715, 50
Atl. 417 (1901).
Beachley v. Estate of Bollinger, 119 Md. 151, 157, 86 Atl. 135 (1912).
0 Newcomer v. Beeler, 116 Md. 647, 650, 82 Atl. 460 (1911) ; Md. Code,
Art. 93, Sec. 87.
'1 In re Peavey's Estate, 144 Minn. 208, 175 N. W. 105 (1919).
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or the audit of an account or statement filed in a manner
prescribed by law."
At common law an executor or administrator, having
an absolute power of disposal over the whole of the personal effects of the testator or intestate, had authority to
compromise or accept any composition or otherwise settle
any debt, claim, or thing in regard thereto. This power,
as a general rule, still persists as regards the compromising of claims against a decedent's estate. While statutes in some states have been enacted which somewhat restrict this common law power by subjecting the representative's action to court approval, 18 yet the right of an executor or administrator to compromise
a claim against his
14
decedent's estate is still recognized.
The Orphans' Court is given the power to authorize and
direct any executor, administrator, or guardian to compromise any claim against or in favor of the estate of any decedent or ward, as the case may be, in such manner as
the Court may approve. He has however no duty to seek
to compel the creditor to accept less than is legally due. 5
If the compromise is in bad faith, or is not for the best
interests of the estate, the .representative will be denied
credit in his account for the expenditure, and the same is
true in case of payment of a claim to which there is a valid
defense.1'
In McClusky v. Kalben,"' the Court said, quoting from
Badders v. O'Brien :'1
"This act 9 does not confer upon the Orphans'
Court the full powers, with which courts of law and
equity are invested, of deciding upon the validity and
determining the amount of a creditors claim against
the estate of a decedent or ward, but merely the power
to authorize and direct an executor or guardian to
compromise the claim on such terms as merit the
court's approval, without undertaking to determine
its legal status or exact amount. The law looks with
12 In re Kramer's Estate, 255 Pa. St. 595, 100 Atl. 447 (1917).
22 Md. Code, Art. 93,
Sec. 270.
14 Atkinson, Wills 659.
"'in re Pillsbury's Estate, 175 Cal. 454, 166 Pac. 11, 3 A. L. R. 1396
(1917).
"Trevathan's Exr. v. Dee's Exr., 221 Ky. 396, 298 S. W. 975 (1927);
Marshall v. Coleman, 187 Ill. 556, 58 N. E. 628 (1900). As to arbitration
in such cases, see Md. Code, Art. 93, Secs. 266-287. See also Wood v.
Tunnicliff, 74 N. Y. 38 (1878).
7 167 Md. 479, 175 Atl. 449 (1934).
11Supra note 8.
1 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 270.
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favor upon the amicable settlement of controversies
and the prevention of litigation, and a statute conferring power to effect compromise of claims threatening to involve estates in litigation upon -a subordinate
tribunal that is fully equipped to determine their precise legal merits is in harmony with the policy of the
law, and the exercise of that power when fairly made
should be upheld, in the absence of positive error or
injustice.'
In In re Baruth ° it was held that executors who compromise a claim in good faith, and from a reasonable fear
that the litigation may go against them, or that their success therein may prove more costly than a partial surrender, are entitled to credit for the sum paid even though it
be subsequently shown that the claim has no foundation.
However, a representative is not entitled, on settlement,
to the sums paid out in compromise of a claim where the
compromise was not in good faith and for the best interests of the estate, especially where the representative did
not seek the court's approval. In the principal case the
court said there should be a new accounting and, if the administrator could then show that the settlement was advantageous to the estate, it should be ratified.
2162 Misc. 596, 116 N. Y. S. 1125 (1909).

